Ближний Восток и его соседи

g 59 h A Russian Post-Imperial Policy Paper on the Imperial Political Logic Concerning... its position towards Central Asian principalities 27 . Surprisingly Vvedenskiy disregards the Bolshevik denouncement of all previous international treaties. Finally, Vvedenskiy warns against growing ambitions of the independent Emirate of Bukhara and laments theoretical helplessness of “the new socialist government” in dealing with Oriental countries that are “outside the interna- tional legal framework of civilised nations” 28 . In the final part of his paper Vvedenskiy offers some policy recommenda- tions. While doing that he seemingly deludes himself by turning a blind eye to the new Soviet realities 29 that destroy the entire edifice of previous Rus- sian political culture. While analysing the brewing British-Soviet conflict in the Middle East 30 he proposes to reverse the roles with Britain and advocates a Soviet-Afghan alliance to counter the emerging Anglo-Persian one 31 . Moreo- ver, Afghanistan is expected to refrain from any interference into Central Asian affairs, including those of the Bukhara Emirate and humper the supply of Brit- ish weapons across the Amu Daria 32 . Vvedenskiy also ponders on the issues of inter-state trade in the puzzling environment of the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade 33 . Also, there should be no reconsideration of the Soviet-Afghan border and the secession of the Panjdeh oasis toAfghanistan is out of question 34 . Vvedenskiy’s treatise in a rather concise form provides an overview of the Russian imperial concepts with regard to Afghanistan, Central Asia and regional Anglo-Russian dynamics. It appears that they disregard indigenous societal dynamics in favour of great power politics and thrive on suspecting the opponent of all kinds of malevolence. While such an approach does a disservice to a comprehensive understanding of Central Asian and Afghan developments it sheds light on the ambiguous nature of British-Afghan sym- biosis that was obvious for the then contemporary observers but later glossed over by Afghan historiography and Soviet researches who jumped on the na- tionalist Afghan bandwagon. 27 Vvedenskiy. P. 88–89. 28 Ibid. P. 97–99. 29 Characteristically the words Soviet, Communist or Bolshevik are never used in the document. 30 He describes it as “our inevitable war with England for Indian approaches” (Vvedenskiy. P. 102). 31 Accepting the need for the improvement of ties with Afghanistan Vvedenskiy regrets that it will be no substitute for the lost Russian influence in Iran (Vvedenskiy. P. 92). He also notes that Iran may serve as a conduit of British influence in Central Asia where with the waning of the Rus- sian power locals might consider gravitating towards Britain that has much to offer them economi- cally (Vvedenskiy. P. 93–94). 32 Vvedenskiy. P. 108. 33 Vvedenskiy. P. 104–105. 34 Vvedenskiy. P. 109.