Ближний Восток и его соседи

g 58 h Sergei Andreyev In his analysis of Central Asian instability in the 1840–1850’s Vvedenskiy correctly notices the domino effect of strengthening of one of the regional prin- cipalities that always led to turmoil. In his view while assisting Afghanistan Great Britain simultaneously promoted the independence of Turkmen tribes. This British policy failure caused by the Russian advancement to the Turk- men lands 19 had a side effect of the secession of Anglo-Russian hostilities in the area as Central Asian principalities were firmly incorporated into the Rus- sian sphere of influence with little chances for successful Britain-led coalition building 20 . Therefore, the British influence was confined to Afghanistan while Iran was gravitating towards Russia 21 . Vvedenskiy claims the benefits of the inclusion of Turkmen lands into imperial markets for the regional trade and outlines military advantages in case of a hypothetical Russian attack on Herat or an Afghan military advancement to the north 22 . In the concluding part of this section Vvedenskiy summarises British policies towards Afghanistan and Turkmen lands as those promoting chaos in the latter while strengthening the former with an eye on winning over Central Asian principalities on its side 23 . In Section Four while defending the Russian approach to border demarca- tion that he describes as geographical-ethnographic, as opposed to territorial- political, Vvedenskiy claims that inadvertently it catered for the livelihood of the Turkmen nomads; therefore, introducing contemporary considerations well before their time 24 . Recent Afghan claims to the Panjdeh oasis are dis- missed as baseless ambitions catering for the domestic Afghan agenda and resulting from the current turmoil in Central Asia that inter alia threw back Anglo-Russian relations to the uncertainty of 1826–1883–1885 25 . Commenting on the establishment of the Soviet-Afghan diplomatic rela- tions Vvedenskiy never mentions the Afghan declaration of independence 26 and considers these ties as a violation of the 1872 and 1883–1885 Anglo-Rus- sian agreements prohibiting reciprocal interference into Afghan and Central Asian affairs. He expects Britain to invoke the quid pro quo principle vis-à-vis 19 Vvedenskiy maintains that the Turkmens voluntary subdued themselves to the Russian rule, glossing over military campaigns in their lands (Vvedenskiy. P. 66). 20 Vvedenskiy. P. 68–69, 79–80. 21 Vvedenskiy. P. 71, 73. 22 Vvedenskiy. P. 75–76. 23 Vvedenskiy. P. 77–79. 24 Vvedenskiy. P. 81–82. 25 Vvedenskiy. P. 84–86. 26 Later on, he calls it “an untimely declaration” that potentially provokes the British (Vveden- skiy. P. 91).